Abstract
The political influence that geographic combatant commanders, the so-called "proconsuls," wield highlights the need for better political-military integration at the operational level. Current doctrine and organization have significant gaps that particularly impact on the planning and execution of "post-hostilities" operations and thus on successful war termination. Current doctrine advocates interagency coordination at this level, but in contrast to a sophisticated national-level structure, there is minimal guidance on how the combatant commander can effect this. Unnecessarily dividing combat operations between war and MOOTW also obscures the nature of the political-military relationship. There is, moreover, no effective structure. The ambassador, doctrinally the key contact for the combatant commander, is not the CinCs' real counterpart; the operational level at State, where regional policy coordination is done, is that of the regional Assistant Secretaries. While the combatant commanders have political advisors (POLADS), the POLADs' status of personal staff officers and the lack of doctrine regarding their function lead to ad hoc, informal coordination rather than a proper system. Structural problems within State further erode the POLADs' effectiveness. Current doctrine recognizes, but accepts, these deficiencies. This paper proposes that POLADS become formal State representatives, providing a number of real advantages to the combatant commanders as well as driving the establishment of concrete procedures regarding political-military coordination.
1 "Will you please tell me what in hell the State Department has to do in an active theater of war?" -U.S. Army Major General, North Africa, 1942 "War is a projection of policy when other means fail. The State Department is responsible to the President for foreign policy…The North African theater played an active role in the period prior to the U.S. entry into the war; its political trends were important to our policy makers. The State Department had direct responsibility in the preparatory stage leading to the invasion. It was directly concerned in the political decisions inevitably to be made during the military operations, and it will have to deal with the postwar political effects of this campaign. Furthermore, General Eisenhower needs someone to deal with the French officials and leaders on the civilian level. And that is why I am here." -U.S. Minister Robert Murphy, Political Advisor to General Eisenhower and State Department representative in the theater. 
I. INTRODUCTION: The Proconsuls
This is how operational-level political-military coordination was effected in "the big one" and how, this paper will recommend, we should do it again. Although Murphy never refers to Clausewitz, he gave a summary of the latter's view of the relationship between war and politics. Now that we have the benefit of reading Clausewitz in our senior service institutions, one might surmise that the doctrine and organization for unity of effort between soldiers and diplomats would be solidly established throughout all relevant levels of our national security system.
We have by and large succeeded in achieving this unity at the strategic level, but at the operational one a number of political-military gaps remain. There is a key conceptual gap in how we get from the military objective to the desired political end state, doctrinal gaps regarding how combatant commanders coordinate with the Department of State and what function the Political Advisor serves, and organizational gaps both between the combatant commanders and the State Department and within the State department itself.
The net result, in the current post-Cold War environment, is a policy vacuum that has tended to be filled by the regional combatant commanders, a subject which came to public attention in September 2000 when Dana Priest wrote a series of articles in the Washington Post describing them as "proconsuls."
2 This issue has since become a fashionable topic of discussion. Ambassador David Abshire of the Center for International and Strategic Studies has held a session on it, the Secretary's "Open Forum" at State is in the midst of presenting a four-part discussion series on it, 3 and it is often raised in question periods at the war colleges. To integrate force and diplomacy as a new sort of policy tool, the Defense and State Departments will have to break out of old cultural and institutional barriers to an unprecedented extent and find new, creative ways of doing business altogether. 4 He saw this as extending to State's interaction with the Pentagon in the formulation of goals and objectives in defense policy and with the CinCs in developing their Theater Engagement
Plans. This paper examines a modest measure in this regard that should serve as a catalyst for further development of political-military doctrine and organization.
II. ANALYZING THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GAPS:
Starting with Clausewitz… We all know the core precept of Clausewitz, that war is "not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument." 5 If we really believe this, it would necessarily follow that our political and military goals, and our diplomatic and military instruments, ought to be closely interlinked. But do we? Judging from the joint doctrine capstone publications -Joint Publication 1 "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United
States," Joint Publication 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces," and Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations" -we do not. While there are a few references to Clausewitz therein, and acknowledgement that "war is an instrument of policy" 6 and that "wars are only successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure," 7 there is surprisingly little specific reference made to working with the principal foreign policy agency, and the full implications of the connection with war and diplomacy are never fully drawn out.
Whatever may be said in general terms about the political-military link, Americans have traditionally taken a position directly opposed to Clausewitz's basic premise, treating war and diplomacy as two separate activities, conducted by two separate institutions. This still appears to be the "default" setting of both American soldiers and diplomats alike, evident not in theory but in practice. The "single objective" of the military according to JP 1, "winning the nation's wars," illustrates this tendency. 8 The final phase of war termination, by which one reaches the political objective of the war, is implicitly someone else's business. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this discipline lapsed into history, rendering the ad hoc nature of regional political-military coordination increasingly apparent. This is particularly troubling given that, in virtually all foreseeable future operations, the United States will have limited objectives rather than seek the complete overthrow of our opponents. The use of force will thus take on an increasingly "political" cast. This would not bother Clausewitz, who would say that it simply reflects a different part on the continuum of politics, but it plays havoc with the traditional American separation of military activities and diplomacy. The upshot is that the military tends to be concerned about what it deems to be political interference in its operations, while the diplomats see the military as increasingly taking on policy roles, or at least acting independently in areas that inevitably have foreign policy implications.
The Problem of War Termination.
If the strategic military objective is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and the occupation of his country, achieving it will enable us to impose whatever political terms we wish. In any other case, the achievement of the military objective would be a sine qua non for reaching our desired political end state but will not in itself not get us there directly. The "post-hostilities" phase of our strategy -which should be an integral part of our strategy at its inception -is then equally as critical for our ultimate success. Moreover, how we achieve the military objective will obviously affect this "post-hostilities" phase. As doctrine cautions, "the outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis." 14 It should also not conflict with our political objectives in other areas of the globe. To avoid "unintended consequences," both regionally and globally, we need close and continuous political-military coordination in both the planning and execution of combat operations A Single Continuum? The way we currently divide doctrine, however, tends to produce unnecessary duplication or, worse, differentiation, allowing the military and policymakers alike to revert to thinking in the traditional compartmented terms. Doctrine does note in passing the "singularly important threshold" of the use, or threat of use, of military force, a threshold that "is the distinction between combat and non-combat operations." 15 The governing doctrinal threshold, however, is now placed between "war" and "military operations other than war"
(MOOTW), unfortunately and illogically dividing combat operations -"war" in Clausewizian terms --into two separate bits. MOOTW doctrine then combines one of these bits with noncombat operations, further adding to the confusion. 16 This would be little more than a semantic curiosity except that an entire body of separate doctrine, providing even different principles of war, has been written for MOOTW. 17 MOOTW doctrine emphasizes in particular the necessity for interagency coordination, but in doing so leaves the implication that such is not equally the case during "war" itself. As another example, doctrine emphasizes that, in MOOTW, "planning for post-conflict operations should begin as early as possible, and preferably before the conflict begins." 18 Why should this be different than "war" is not addressed. One can only surmise that, for a real "war," the military remains in the frame of mind of the anonymous major general quoted at the start of this paper.
When doctrine does speak about coordination, it refers to an all-inclusive "interagency"
process covering all branches of the government and NGOs, thereby obscuring the key political-military link between State and Defense. Moreover, the traditional separation of war and diplomacy still occasionally tends to rear its head. Doctrine, for example, states that a military commander may in the post-hostilities phase hand over responsibilities to another US Government agency, but without specific mention of how this is to be planned for, coordinated, and effected. The bias is also evident in the 1995 Joint Publication 1, which says that Operation DESERT STORM was "a triumph of the joint operational art." 19 This is certainly true but, ten years on, as we still struggle with the political problems remaining from how we conducted the post-hostilities phase, a little less hubris might be in order. The war and diplomacy link was never fully made in the Gulf and, with USAF aircraft still flying combat patrols, we have arguably yet to see successful war termination there. Much the same can be said for other postCold War operations, be they in Haiti or the Balkans. In the current, perhaps less threatening but certainly more complex international environment, we must do better. 20 The leading position of State in developing regional national security policy is thus formally recognized, though flesh must be put on this bone.
Our Focus on Political-Military Coordination at the Strategic Level…
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…Is Not Reflected at the Operational Level. Political objectives are turned into military ones at the operational level: "JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate political aims into strategy and operational design." 22 In the commander's estimate process, the start of this process, the mission analysis doctrinally includes long-and short-term objectives for conflict termination.
While stating that military commanders are "rarely concerned with only" military end state conditions and "may be required to support the other instruments of national power," 23 however, it implies that they do not necessarily have ultimate responsibility for realizing the political aim. Under "termination," doctrine notes that "during the post-hostilities and redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces." 24 Though every situation is unique, it is still striking that virtually nothing is said about who these "other authorities" may be, nor when and how the planning for such a transfer of control should take place. We posit here that the "post-hostilities" phase can only be successful if there is effective coordination both in the initial planning and in handling of the day-to-day adjustments caused by the interplay of both sides in the fog and friction of using military force. Examples Despite all the admonitions contained in doctrine, and an entire joint publication being devoted to interagency coordination, 29 the virtual silence as to how this is to be done in the political-military area, as well as the lack of an adequate structure to do so, largely undercuts the exhortations. The military thus often develops plans independently of other government agencies. 30 President Clinton attempted to improve the situation with PDD/NSC 56 of May 1997. This PDD recognizes the need to "facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level," but contains no concrete measures to do so. Moreover, the measures therein apply only to specific "complex contingency operations." The latter in effect are defined as "peace operations" and are not those involving "international armed conflict." 31 In war and operations other than war, combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power. State does so among seven geographic bureaus, a one-on-one correlation is not possible.
If doctrine were to dictate coordination between the operational levels at State and Defense, what structure would be needed to do it? In 1942 we had Robert Murphy, the prototype political advisor, or POLAD, and one could posit that the POLAD would be the appropriate person to effect this. From 1942 to 1952, POLADS were nearly co-equals with their military counterparts and their directives emphasized their political rather than advisory role. 43 . Substantial changes came about, however, with the establishment of our modern POLAD system in 1952. 44 Current POLADS are not formal representatives of the State Department, but rather personal staff officers of the military commanders. This may reduce the possibility of friction between agencies, but it does so by putting the latter in very ambiguous positions. Doctrine is virtually silent on how POLADS are to be used. In a review of all a combatant commander's personal staff officers, for example, only the POLAD has no description of duties. 45 Doctrine's only reference to the POLAD says:
In order to effectively bring all elements of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, combatant commanders are augmented with representatives from other agencies…Frequently, geographic combatant commands are assigned a Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) 
III. BRIDGING THE GAPS: POLADs as Formal State Representatives
The military drives changes with doctrine, and so we have to look at developing true interagency doctrine. This indeed is the sort of thing that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs should be well equipped for on State's part but, because of the inevitable give and take, the doctrine would have to be developed under the auspices of the NSC.
The State Department, in contrast, tends to eschew doctrine, but small changes in its organization can have significant effects. 54 One modest step the author proposes here would be The military is likely to be wary of this, seeing it as the introduction of a State "mole." A former POLAD to the commander of NATO IFOR noted some resistance to establishing a POLAD in Bosnia because of the fear that, without the right terms of reference, it could create opportunities for the NAC "to become involved in day-to-day operational decisions, thus undermining the authority of the commander." 55 While this may be true, our contention here is that it at times may be necessary. In stressing the "political nature of peacekeeping operations," By writing the doctrine to specifically cover the operational political-military linkage between
State and Defense and effecting this reordering of relationships, the national security structure would at minimal cost create a catalyst for resolving the political-military issues noted above.
The fact that both primary Cabinet Departments will have definite coordination responsibilities on the operational level will create a synergy that will in turn drive the institutionalization of coordinating mechanisms and procedures to ensure effective war termination at the operational level.
IV. CONCLUSION: Muddling Through According to Doctrine, or…
We can go forward in either of two ways: muddling through and accepting that:
…there is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations. Nor is there an overseeing organization to ensure that the myriad agencies, departments, and organizations have the capability and tools to work together…Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations." 58 or we can develop the requisite overarching interagency doctrine and create adequate structures and procedures covering at least the two principal Cabinet agencies involved in national security policy. Unity of effort at the operational, just as at the strategic level, can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency coordination and cooperation intended to overcome bureaucratic and personal limitations, all to win our country's wars politically as well as militarily.
